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1. Introduction 
This paper considers the problem of equalizing opportunities among agents who differ 
in their tastes and innate productive abilities. While it may be argued that both 
attributes are "circumstances of birth," I begin with the premise that taste differences 
may provide a suitable basis for distinguishing economic rewards but differences in 
innate ability do not. 1 In particular, if agents have the same opportunities and choose 
to exploit them differently, then such heterogeneities need not be of social concern. 
However, if agents' opportunities differ for reasons beyond their control, then this 
warrants remediation. Such is the case with innate talents or handicaps. Thus, any 
influence these have on the allocation of rewards should be minimized. Toward this 
end, an egalitarian planner provides public education or training to those with lesser 
abilities in order to effect a more equitable distribution of income generating skills. 
The problem is complicated by the fact that both preferences and abilities are private 
information known only to the agents themselves. Thus, in addition to determining 
the appropriate level of education to provide each individual, the planner must also 
identify the correct recipient. Formally, therefore, the task is to design an education 
policy that equalizes opportunities and simultaneously solves the (multidimensional) 
screening problem. 
Roemer [25], Bossert [4], Fleurbaey [11, 12, 13] and others2 have considered the 
problem of equalizing opportunities when agents are responsible, in part, for their 
circumstances.3 They argue that agents should be held accountable for, and only for, 
those circumstances under their control, and that society should indemnify agents for 
the consequences of their handicaps. Bossert describes the problem succinctly as fol-
lows. Pre-tax incomes, or outcomes, are determined by a set of characteristics, some 
of which are deemed relevant (for the purpose of allocating rewards) and others irrel-
evant. The problem is to find an allocation mechanism4 which eliminates the effects 
of irrelevant characteristics (call it a neutralizing mechanism), while preserving the 
IThe purpose of this paper is not to define the proper domain of individual responsibility, but 
rather to consider tools which may be applicable to such a discussion. In principle, these or similar 
tools can be developed for other domains as well. For discussions of the proper domain, see, for 
example, Arneson [1], Cohen [9], or Roemer [25]. 
2See Bossert and Fleurbary [5); Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer [6); Fleurbaey and Maniquet 
[14, 15); Iturbe-Ormaetxe and Nieto [18); Sprumont [26]; and Van de gaer [30]. 
3For an alternative approach to the issue of equitable opportunities, see Kranich [19, 20] where I 
consider the problem of ranking distributions of opportunities on the basis of fairness. The framework 
employed therein can be interpreted either as abstracting from the problem of individual responsibility 
or as applying to the residual elements once endogenous opportunities (those for which individuals 
are responsible) have been extracted. In either case, the objective is to construct a complete ranking 
(and thus to compare unequal distributions) rather than to formulate a notion of fairness. 
4In his case, a redistribution mechanism. 
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influence of relevant characteristics (call it a reward mechanism). Such a mechanism 
is said to equalize opportunities. Here, preferences are deemed relevant and innate 
productivities irrelevant. 
The aforementioned authors considered the complete information case in which 
individual characteristics are known. Even in this context, however, it is not obvious 
how to formulate the precise requirements of a neutralizing reward mechanism when 
agents differ in more than one dimension. One (axiomatic) approach, adopted by 
Bossert and Fleurbaey, is to specify conditions only for those cases in which agents 
share a common characteristic (Le., on the appropriate subspaces of characteristics) 
where one's intuition is a more reliable guide. Another approach, adopted by Roemer 
[25]; Van de gaer [30]; and Bossert, Fleurbaey, and Van de gaer [6] entails specifying 
a social welfare function which then enables comparisons of arbitrary characteristics. 
(Ideally, the latter should generalize the former in that social optima should respect 
the conditions when restricted to the appropriate subspaces - I will return to this 
point below.) 
Among the axioms posed by Bossert and Fleurbaey, the following (strongest ver-
sions) have the greatest intuitive appeal.5 The first reflects the fact that innate abilities 
lie outside the domain of individual responsibility and thus are compensable, and the 
second that only such differences warrant compensation. 
First, if agents have the same preferences, then any resulting difference in their 
welfare levels must result from their differential handicaps. In this case, a neutralizing 
reward mechanism would ensure that, ex post, agents with equal preferences attain 
equal welfare. I refer to this as EWEP. 
Next, if agents have the same ability, then while their choices (and welfare) may 
differ, there is no ethical basis for differential treatment vis-a-vis a remedial program. 
Consequently, if one agent were to receive compensation for his or her handicap, 
then all other agents with the same handicap should receive the same compensation. 
A neutralizing reward mechanism should thus provide equal compensation for those 
with equal innate abilities. Subsequently, I call this ECEA. 
Bossert and Fleurbaey established that, in general, it is possible to equalize oppor-
tunities (Le., there exists an allocation mechanism which satisfies EWEP and ECEA) 
if and only if the utility (or outcome) functions are separable in the relevant and ir-
relevant characteristics. In the notation of the present paper, utility is a function of 
external resources (e), talents (w) (for which the individual is not responsible), and 
variables for which the individual is responsible (a). Then in order to equalize oppor-
tunities, it must be the case that utility is separable in the form u(</J(w, e), a); and, in 
this case, equal opportunity is achieved by equalizing </J(w, e) across individuals. 
Fleurbaey, in particular, argues that the separability requirement is extremely 
restrictive and "unlikely to be satisfied except in rather special cases" such as when 
"the external resources are of the same nature as the handicaps" and are thus additive. 
5Fleurbaey writes that any weakening of these requisites "implies that some desirable features of 
the equalizing procedure must be abandoned." 
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Initially, I consider the benchmark case involving complete information. There, I 
point out that in many models involving education, separability arises quite naturally.6 
Therefore, equal opportunities can be achieved in the manner described above, namely, 
by equating </J( w, e) across individuals. Here, w is interpreted as innate productive 
ability, e denotes educational resources, and </J describes the education technology 
whereby wand e are transformed into final, or ex post, ability.7,8 Thus, equati!lg 
</J(w, e) across individuals means equalizing ex post abilities. Notice also that since 
this first-best objective is achievable (in the event of complete information), any social 
welfare ordering that is consistent with EWEP and ECEA would recommend a similar 
solution; one need not resort to second-best considerations for which the social welfare 
function approach is better-suited.9 
Next, I turn to the case of incomplete information where the agents' innate pro-
ductive abilities and taste parameters are unobservable. Here, two questions arise: (i) 
which policies can be implemented in light of the informational asymmetry? and (ii) 
is it possible to achieve equitable opportunities?lO I will argue that, at least for the 
special case in which agents have identical preferences, it is possible to implement any 
input progressivelleducation policy - including that of fully equalizing ex post abilities 
- but there is an (informational) cost of doing so. Even in this case (in which pref-
erences are identical and separable), there is no (differentiable) allocation mechanism 
which equalizes opportunities and is consistent with the incentives of the agents. As 
a result, the obstacles to achieving equal opportunities in the context of incomplete 
information are even more formidable. 
Given that the first-best objective is unachievable in this context, it is necessary 
to consider alternative recourses. One route, pursued by Bossert, Fleurbaey, and 
6See Arrow [2], Bruno [8], Hare and Ulph [17], Ulph [29], and Thomala [27, 28]. 
7This specification of the education technology abstracts from the fact that effort expended at 
school may affect the productivity of education. The references cited above employ the present 
specification. In contrast, Roemer [25] and Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer (6] incorporate the 
effort effect. The former specification may suffice in the event returns to education accrue to the 
level achieved rather than the performance within each level (for example, earnings surveys generally 
distinguish between high school versus college graduates rather than on the basis of grade point 
averages in college), in the event students within each level expend roughly equal amounts of effort, 
or if effort is measured by time. In any case, the alternative specification would affect the results 
presented here. 
BIt should be noted that in Bossert [4]; Fleurbaey [11, 12, 13J and Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de 
gaer [6], the authors explicitly assume that the individual characteristics are not influenced by the 
allocation rule or policy. In contrast, the purpose of education is precisely to alter abilities. 
9 A social welfare ordering is consistent with EWEP if, when restricted to a subspace of agents 
with identical preferences, the (restricted) social optimum entails equalizing utilities. Analogously, a 
social welfare ordering is consistent with ECEA if it recommends equal compensation for those with 
equal abilities. 
lO"Implementability" is defined precisely below. Intuitively, it means that each agent receives its 
intended reward despite the fact that agents with private information may behave strategically. 
llFollowing Arrow [2J, I refer to an educational policy as input progressive if agents with lesser 
abilities receive more educational resources. 
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Van de gaer in the complete information case, is to relax the requirements and to 
consider weak forms of the axioms. However, as Fleurbaey points out, "weakening the 
requisites of equal opportunities to remove this problem [of incompatibility between 
the strongest forms of the axioms] ... implies that some desirable features of the 
equalizing procedure must be abandoned." A second course, and that adopted here, 
is the social welfare function approach of Roemer [25] and Van de gaer [30]. This has 
the advantage that when first-best outcomes are unattainable (as is the case here), 
the social welfare function obviates second-best considerations. Since the objective of 
the present normative analysis is to achieve full equality, I consider the lexicographic 
extension of the egalitarian or Rawlsian social welfare function, or the leximin objective 
function. 12 To illustrate the approach, I consider an example in Roemer [25], and I 
extend it to the incomplete information context. Specifically, I identify the second-best 
education policy and thus quantify the limits to equalization. 
The fact that the first-best optimum under the leximin objective function is not 
achievable due to incentive considerations should be contrasted with the findings of 
Dasgupta and Hammond [10]. These authors consider lump-sum redistributive taxa-
tion based on unobservable skills, and they establish that the first-best taxation scheme 
under the maximin social welfare ordering is indeed incentive compatible. This appar-
ent contradiction arises due to the fact that misrepresentation in their model entails 
working at different (lesser) skill levels and earning the corresponding wage. As dis-
cussed in the following paragraph, here one strategically announces a skill level for the 
purpose of affecting the allocation of educational resources, but one continues to work 
at one's true level. Thus, for example, if educational resources are allocated on the 
basis of performance on a standardized test, then one need only misrepresent one's 
ability on the exam rather than in the workforce. 
Before proceeding to the model, some comments on the technical analysis are in 
order. First, in the incomplete information case, the planner's objective, again, is 
to design a policy that equalizes opportunities and simultaneously identifies the cor-
rect recipients. Given such a mechanism design problem, it is typical to invoke the 
revelation principle (for games with incomplete information).13 According to the prin-
ciple, in place of whatever screening devise the planner might employ, it is sufficient 
to consider a direct revelation mechanism in which agents announce their character-
istics and the mechanism assigns an outcome and, moreover, to focus on equilibria 
in which agents announce their true characteristics. That is, for any equilibrium of 
any mechanism, there is a truthful equilibrium of a direct mechanism which yields 
the same equilibrium outcome. Consequently, I consider only direct mechanisms and 
I establish (sufficient) conditions under which such a mechanism provides each agent 
the incentive to reveal its true type. In doing so, I restrict my attention to differen-
tiable mechanisms, and I adopt the first-order approach to incentive compatibility of 
12Note that this is consistent with EWEP and ECEA at the first-best optimum in the manner 
described earlier. 
13See Fudenberg and Tirole [16J, pp.253-257j or Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [23J, pp.883-884. 
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Laffont and Maskin [21]. I then show that there is a fundamental conflict between the 
first-order conditions for incentive compatibility and the goal of EWEP. Intuitively, 
in order to induce agents to reveal their true productivities, it is necessary that those 
with higher productivity receive greater income. Since the first-order conditions are 
necessary here, this establishes the incompatibility. 
The result that it is possible to implement any input progressive education policy 
(Theorem 4.1, below) is obtained by modifying the argument of Berliant and Gouveia 
[3]. There, the authors considered the problem of implementing individual revenue 
requirements (Le., agent-specific taxes) as a function of unobservable skill. In their 
framework, skill is invariant, and the objective is to design an income tax scheme which 
has the effect of insuring that each type pays a predetermined amount, depending on 
their skill level. In contrast, in my model skill is variable (through education), and 
the objective is to design a scheme to insure that agents receive the appropriate level 
of educational support, depending on their initial talents. Thus, in spite of the formal 
similarities, the economic interpretations of the results are quite different. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I describe the basic structure 
of the model. In Section 3, I consider the axiomatic approach for the benchmark case 
of complete information. First, I abstract from the issue of raising revenue, and then I 
consider the issue of taxation. In Section 4, I turn to the case of incomplete information 
where, first, I demonstrate the difficulty of adopting the axiomatic approach in the 
context of fixed educational resources, and then I demonstrate the alternative, social 
welfare function approach by means of an example. Finally, Section 6 contains a brief 
conclusion. 
2. The Basic Model 
There is a continuum of agents who differ in their tastes and innate productive abil-
ities. Each agent is endowed with one unit of time and has preferences defined over 
consumption, c, and labor, l. I assume the taste differences can be described by a sin-
gle parameter a E A = [am, am] C lR++, and thus preferences are represented by the 
(single) utility function u(c, l; a) defined on X = lR+ x [0,1]. Only ordinal properties 
of u are used in the sequel. I impose the following standard restrictions on u. 
Assumptions on u: for all a E A, 
o 
Au.1 Differentiability: u is C2 on X.14 
Au.2 Monotonicity: Ul > 0, U2 < 0. 
Au.3 Strict quasiconcavity: Un < 0, U22 < 0, unu~ - 2U12UIU2 + U22U~ < 0. 
AuA Normality: U12U2 - U22Ul > 0. 
Au.5 Interiority: 
lim Ul (c, l; a) = 00 
C~O 
14Subscripts denote partial derivatives all of which are evaluated on the interior of X, denoted i. 
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Hm U2(C, l; a) - -00 
l-+1 
Hm U2(C, l; a) - 0 
l-+O 
Each agent is endowed with an innate productive ability, w (for wage rate). I 
assume it is known that innate abilities lie in the range n = [wm, wm] C lR++. An 
agent is thus fully described by its characteristics in A x n. Hence, I associate the 
set of agents, N, with the space of characteristics, A x n, and I denote specific agents 
by i = (ai, wi), j = (aj , wi), etc. I describe the joint distribution of a and w by the 
density f : N -+ [0,1].15 
The principal redistributive instrument available to the government is an education 
policy, or program. Such a policy is described by a function e : N -+ lR+, where e(a, w) 
specifies the quantity of (public) educational resources to be afforded an individual 
of type (a, w). Generally, I will use ei to denote the resources allocated to agent i. 
The education technology, that is, the process by which educational resources affect 
measured productivity, is given by the function </> : n x lR+ -+ lR++; </>(w, x) measures 
the ex post ability of an agent whose innate ability is w and who receives (external) 
educational resources x. I assume </> satisfies the following: 
Assumptions on </>: 
o 
A1>.1 Differentiability: 1> is C2 on n xlR++. 
A1>.2 Monotonicity: 1>w > 0, </>x > o. 
A1>.3 Educability: for all wEn and for all w > w', there exists x E lR+ such that 
1>(w, x) = w'. 
A</>.4 Weak complementarity: 1>w· ~ ~ </>xw· :tz. 
Assumptions A</>.1 and A1>.2 are standard. A</>.3 means that given sufficient resources 
anyone is educable to any extent, or each agent is capable of achieving any ability level 
ex post. Finally, consider that </>xw can be of either sign. If it is negative (x and ware 
substitutes), then A</>.4 follows from A1>.2. If it is positive (x and ware complements), 
then A1>.4 requires that the degree of complementarity be sufficiently weak. Specifi-
cally, it requires that the direct influence of innate ability on final ability dominates 
the indirect effect through enhancing the productivity of educational resources. Both 
the direct and the indirect effects are expressed as elasticities. A1>.4 is satisfied by the 
entire class of CES production functions. 
One education policy of particular interest here is that in which ex post abilities 
are fully equalized. Before defining this formally, I introduce the following notation. 
For w' > w, let </>-I(W, w') denote the amount of educational resources necessary for 
an agent with innate ability w to achieve ex post ability w'. Under A</>.2 and A</>.3, 
</>-1 is well-defined. 
15Implicitly, therefore, I assume the popUlation size is normalized to 1. 
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Definition 2.1. The education policy which fully equalizes ex post abilities (at wm ) 
is defined byei = </J-l(W\Wm ). 
Under e, all agents would achieve the ability level wm. Thus, any resulting dif-
ferences in income would reflect different levels of labor / effort (presumably resulting 
from different preferences for leisure). Subsequently, when considering the policy of 
full equalization, I will abbreviate cjJ-l(Wi ,Wm ) by (fi-l(W i ). 
In the following sections, I consider two cases. In the first, the aggregate quantity 
of educational resources is fixed; in the second, the government levies taxes in order 
to finance education. 
3. Complete Information: A Benchmark Case 
3.1. Lump-sum policies with fixed educational resources 
To determine the effect of the informational asymmetry, I begin by considering the 
benchmark case involving complete information. Thus, I assume the government has 
at its disposal all of the relevant information in the economy including knowledge of the 
precise characteristics of each agent. Therefore, it is possible to distinguish between 
agents on the basis of their characteristics as well as their behavior. Moreover, given 
such information, I assume it is possible to implement lump-sum (first-best) policies 
specific to each agent type.16 
Also, in this subsection, I abstract from the issue of raising revenues for the purpose 
of financing education. Rather, I assume there is a fixed quantity of educational 
resources, R. In the absence of taxation, a policy simply consists of an education 
program, e. Such a program is feasible providing 
(3.1) 
Let E(R) denote the set of feasible education programs with aggregate resources R. 
Taking e E E(R) as given, the problem facing agent i is the following: 
y . 
max u(y, </J( . ') ; a'). (3.2) y . w t , et 
Let yi(e) denote the solution to (3.2), and let vi(e) = u(yi(e), 4>cJeli ); ai),17 
I now turn to the objective of the government. In this section, rather than specify 
a particular objective function, I take an appropriate policy to be one which satisfies 
the following properties: 
16Since I am interested in determining which policies are achievable from a normative point of 
view rather than with their actual implementation, I abstract from political constraints which may 
preclude lump-sum policies. 
17Under the above assumptions, there will be a unique maximizer of (3.2). 
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Axiom 1 (EWEP). Equal-welfare-for-equal-preference: for all i,j E N, if a i = ai, 
then viCe) = viCe). 
Axiom 2 (ECEA). Equal-compensation-for-equal-ability: for all i,j E N, if w i = 
wi , then ei = ei . 
As described in the Introduction, EWEP means that when agents have identical 
tastes the only basis for distinguishing economic rewards are differences in innate 
abilities. Since the latter are assumed to be irrelevant, an appropriate policy should 
neutralize any welfare differences. IS Alternatively, ECEA means that agents with the 
same irrelevant characteristic should be treated equally vis-a-vis the education policy. 
Otherwise, the policy would depend on attributes which the government expressly 
does not wish to offset (here, taste differences). 
Definition 3.1. An education policy provides equal opportunities if it satisfies EWEP 
and ECEA. 
Bossert and Fleurbaey have shown that EWEP and ECEA are compatible only 
when u is separable in a. Moreover, Fleurbaey argues that the assumption of separabil-
ity is rarely justified. As the next result shows, however, education provides a natural 
setting in which the separability condition is satisfied. First, let R = IN (fi-I(wi)dj. 
Theorem 3.2. If R ;::: R, then the policy of fully equalizing ex post abilities, e, 
provides equal opportunities. 
Proof. Clearly, e depends only on w and thus satisfies ECEA. Also, if a i = ai and 
4>(wi,ei) = 4>(wi ,ei ) in (3.2), then viCe) = vi (e) . • 
3.2. Lump-sum policies with taxation 
Next, suppose the government were to impose lump-sum taxes in order to finance 
education. Then a policy will include a specification of the tax structure as well. 
Formally, a (lump-sum) tax junction is a mapping r: N --+ lR+, where ri = r(ai,wi ) 
indicates the tax levied on agent i. R(r) = INridj is the tax revenue collected under 
r. 
A policy is now a pair p = (r, e) consisting of an education policy, e, as well as a 
tax function, r. Given p, i's optimization problem is now: 
. y . 
max u(y - r" 4>( . .); a'). 
11 w', e' 
(3.3) 
18Roemer [22] argues that "if all agents have the same preferences, it seems any suitable equality-
of-resource mechanism should bring about equality of welfare." 
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Let yi(p) denote the solution to (3.3), and let vi(p) = U(yi(p) - ri, q,(J~1i)jai). pis 
feasible if 
(3.4) 
and 
(3.5) 
Again, I wish to consider the existence of a policy which satisfies EWEP and 
ECEA. Note that EWEP now requires that agents with identical preferences suffer 
equal utility losses from taxation. 
Given that the population size is normalized to 1, R(r) is the average tax as well. 
Therefore, ri = R for all i defines a poll, or head, tax which generates the minimum 
revenue necessary to fully equalize abilities at wm. 
Note that the maximal achievable wealth (that is, if an agent with ability wm were 
to devote full time to work) is wm. 
Theorem 3.3. If wm 2:: R, then p = (r, e) is feasible and, furthermore, it equalizes 
opportunities. 
Proof. First, given the boundary conditions, Au.5, the solution yi(p) will be such 
that yi(p) > R. Thus, (3.5) holds. Also, under r, the tax burden is fully allocated, 
i.e., R = IN ridf. Hence, (3.4) is satisfied, and p is feasible. 
Clearly, p satisfies ECEA. In this case, the problem facing i is to 
max u(y - R, ~j ai). If ai = ai, then yi(p) = yi(p) and vi(p) = vi(p) .• 
y W 
The results of this section demonstrate that in the benchmark case involving com-
plete information it is indeed possible to achieve equal opportunities through public 
education. 
4. Incomplete Information 
4.1. A problem with the axiomatic approach 
I now assume both characteristics, a and w, are private information. Thus, while the 
government again wishes to eliminate the influence of w (and permit differences based 
on a), it cannot observe agents' abilitiesj rather, I assume it can only observe gross 
income or output y = wl. Consequently, the lump-sum, or agent-specific, education 
policies considered in the previous section are no longer feasible. Now the government 
must offer an entire schedule or menu of education levels to all agents and let the 
agents themselves choose the level they prefer. Since the government cannot verify 
the identity of the recipient, it must design a policy which provides each agent the 
incentive to choose the level appropriate for its type, i.e., it must design an incentive 
compatible policy. 
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that there is no policy which provides 
equal opportunities and is incentive compatible. For this, it is sufficient to concentrate 
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on the case in which agents have identical preferences. In this case, the informational 
asymmetry exacts a cost: in order to ensure that agents have the incentive to claim the 
educational resources intended for them, it is necessary that those with higher innate 
productivities receive greater income. But this would necessarily violate EWEP. 
I again consider the case in which aggregate educational resources are fixed. Thus, 
a government policy will consist solely of an education program. Facing such a policy, 
each agent chooses y. As discussed in the Introduction, however, since the informa-
tional asymmetry concerns w, according to the revelation principle (for games with 
incomplete information), it is sufficient to consider the direct revelation mechanism 
in which each agent announces its type (w) and, based on these announcements, the 
mechanism assigns an outcome; that is, it specifies the consumption/production of 
each agent as well as the educational resources it is to be afforded. Thus, the direct 
revelation mechanism consists of a pair (y(w), e(w)), for all wEn. (Clearly, any such 
pair will satisfy ECEA.) 19 Following the first-order approach of Laffont and Maskin 
[21], I will restrict my attention to differentiable mechanisms, or mechanisms in which 
y( w) and e( w )20 are differentiable. 
Given an arbitrary education policy, e, I will say e is implementable if there exists 
y such that the direct revelation mechanism (y, e) induces each agent to announce its 
true ability. Such a mechanism thus awards the (correct) educational resources e(w) 
to an agent with innate ability w. According to the revelation principle, therefore, 
this spans the set of all equilibria of all mechanisms. 
In the terminology of Arrow [2], I will say an education policy is input progressive 
if for all i, j EN, wi > wi implies ei < ei. The following theorem establishes that any 
input progressive education policy is implement able. 
Theorem 4.1. For all e E E(R), if e' < 0, then e is implementable. 
To establish the theorem, I adapt the argument of Berliant and Gouveia [3] for 
implementing individual revenue (tax) requirements for the case involving lump-sum 
education policies. I include the details in an appendix. 
Corollary 4.2. e is implementable. That is, it is possible to fully equalize ex post 
abilities. 
The previous theorem and its corollary afford the prospect of improving the dis-
tribution of opportunities through the use of input progressive education policies and, 
moreover, in a manner consistent with the incentives of the agents. However, the 
following theorem establishes that the extent of such remedial efforts is limited; it 
establishes the logical inconsistency between incentive compatibility and EWEP. 
19For the general case in which agents differ in both a and w, the direct mechanism would consist 
of their announcing both characteristics, and the outcome would specify (y(a, w), e(a, w». Since, at 
present, I am considering the case in which agents have identical preferences, I suppress notation of 
Q. 
20 And, when necessary, the tax function as well. 
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Theorem 4.3. There is no (differentiable) mechanism which provides equal oppor-
tunities and is incentive compatible. 
Proof. Suppose to the contrary, that the policy (y, e) is incentive compatible and 
satisfies EWEP. The problem facing agent i is 
_ y(w) 
m!, u(y(w), cP(wi,e(w))). (4.1) 
Since (y, e) is incentive compatible, the following (necessary) first order condition 
is satisfied at 'Ill = w i . 
( ( -) y( 'Ill) ) '( -) (4 2) Ul Y w, cP(wi,e(w)) .y w + . 
( ( _) y(w) ). (y'(w). cP(wi,e(w)) - 4>x(w
i
,e(w))· e'(w)· y(w)) 
U2 y w , cP(wi, e(w)) cP(wi, e(w))2 
- o. 
That is, 
- 0, (4.3) 
where <I>(wi) = cP(wi , e(wi)). 
Next, since agents have identical preferences, EWEP requires that (y, e) be such 
that all agents achieve the same utility level, or 
( ( i) y( w
i
) ) - £ all· N U Y w '4>(wi , e(wi )) = U or z E . 
Consequently, (4.4) must be preserved as w varies over n. Hence, 
( ( i) y( w
i
) ) '( i) Ul Y w '<I>( wi) . Y w + 
i y( w i ) 
U2(y(W), <I>(Wi))' 
(
y'(wi ) • <I>(wi ) - (cPw(wi , e(wi )) + cPx(wi , e(wi )) • e'(wi )) . y(Wi )) 
<I> (Wi )2 
(4.4) 
- O. (4.5) 
Clearly, (4.3) and (4.5) are consistent only if cPw = o. However, this contradicts 
the fact that cP is strictly increasing .• 
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4.2. The leximin social welfare function 
4.2.1. An example with fixed educational resources 
The results of the previous section are rather disheartening. For the more realistic 
case in which agents' innate abilities are private information, one cannot design an 
education program that equalizes opportunities and that benefits precisely the target 
populations.21 In this section, I demonstrate the alternative approach of specifying a 
social welfare function. In particular, I consider a variation of an example presented 
in Roemer [25].22 However, given the informational asymmetry, the analysis is quite 
different.23 Specifically, I again pose the problem as one of finding an optimal direct 
revelation mechanism. I begin in the present subsection by abstracting from the issue 
of taxation. I then extend the example in the following subsection. 
In Roemer's example, agents have identical preferences represented by the utility 
function u(c, l) = c - ~l2. The budget constraint is y = wl. For simplicity, I assume 
there are two types of agents, those with low productivity, w, and those with high 
productivity, w. (Thus, n = {w,w}.) In particular, I take w = ~ and w = 1. 
Generally, I distinguish values pertaining to the former by "_" and to the latter by 
"-". The government is assumed to know the form of the utility function and the 
distribution of w, but it does not know the type of a particular agent. The education 
technology is of the multiplicative form </J(w, e) = wv'e+1.24 
In this case, a direct revelation mechanism specifies an income/educational re-
source pair for each of the two types. Thus, the mechanism requires that each 
agent announces a type, w or w, and receives either (y,§.) or (y, e), accordingly. 
I will write v(y, e; w) to denote agent w's utility if it ;'ere to receive (y, e), Le., 
v(y, e; w) = y - ~ t/l2r:,e)' 
The problem facing the government is to design an optimal policy subject to the 
incentive compatibility constraints that each agent prefers its own pair and to the 
budgetary constraint that total educational resources per capita do not exceed R, 
which, for simplicity, I take to be 3 - the minimum amount necessary to fully equalize 
21 Note that the lump-sum policies considered here offer the greatest likelihood of achieving first-
best outcomes. Thus, if such targeted programs are prohibited, the prospects are even more limited. 
22Roemer includes various illustrative examples of his theory of equal opportunities with responsi-
bility. One involves production with redistribution without education and another involves education. 
In the latter, effort influences the productivity of education. In this respect, my model of education 
lies in between. However, both of Roemer's examples involve complete information and, in this 
respect, mine is quite different. Analytically, however, the incentive compatibility constraints asso-
ciated with information revelation are closer to the autonomous choice constraints in the example 
involving production. 
23 Also, for this reason, the results are not directly comparable. 
24In the model involving taxation in the following subsection, this specification avoids the "money 
pump" problem, that is, the anomaly that the instantaneous return to education could exceed the 
investment. Were this the case, one could generate infinite income by taxing all earnings and (in-
stantaneously) returning the tax revenue to provide more education. The problem would arise due 
to the static framework. 
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abilities. Here, I formalize the government's objective as follows: 25 
lexi max min{v(y,giW),v(y,eiw)}, 
((]t&).(ij,e)) -
(4.6) 
Thus, the problem is to solve (4.6) subject to the resource, or fiscal, constraint and 
the incentive constraints 
V(1l,gi W) > v(y, ei w) (4.7) 
v(y,ei w) > V(1[,gi w), 
or 
1 y2 1 -2 
> - Y y-- y - 2 w2(1 + e) 
- 2 w2(1 + g) 
1 -2 1 y2 
- Y > (4.8) y - 2 w2(1 + e) y-- . 
- 2w2(1+g) 
In this model, there is no taxation. Therefore, the only issue concerns the allocation 
of R. An egalitarian planner would choose to allocate as much of R as possible to w. 
(Note that were the entire education budget allocated to w, this would not reverse the 
ranking of productivities, i.e., it would still be the case that cp(w,g) ~ cp(w, e).) But 
for any values of g and e, the lexicographic maximization in (4.6) requires that y and 
y be chosen so as to maximize V(y,giW) and v(y,eiw), respectively.26 This entails 
setting 1[ = cp2(W, g) and y = cp2(W,-=e). Then (4.6) becomes 
or, upon substituting, 
lexi m~ min{ -21 cp2(W, g), -21 cp2(W, e)}, 
(~,e) 
lexi m~ min{ ~(1 + g), (1 + e)}. ~,e) 8 (4.9) 
Thus, the government's problem is to solve (4.9) subject to the (per capita) resource 
constraint g + e ~ R and the incentive constraints 
25The lexicographic order on]R2 is defined by (XI,X2) >L (xi,x~) if Xl > Xl or if Xl = xi and 
X2 > X2. The maximization is then with respect to > L. Whereas the maximin social welfare function 
is weakly Pareto efficient (in the first-best context), the leximin is strongly Pareto efficient. 
26The direct mechanism involves offering each agent the optimal income level for its type. Con-
sequently, it may appear that the same outcome could be achieved simply by offering agents their 
choice of ~ or e. However, by offering the choice of (y,~) or (y, e), the planner precludes, for example, 
agent w claiming the resources ~ and earning y. Moreover, since y is observable, compliance with the 
appropriate reward is verifiable. 
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-(1 + e) 
7 
> 32(1 + ~). 
Clearly, (4.10) is nonbinding. 
(4.10) 
(4.11) 
Suppose, for the moment, that the government were to equalize abilities by issuing 
~ = 3 and e = O. This would yield y = y = 1. And, indeed, this would entail 
equal-welfare-for-equal-preferences (v(y~~;w) = v(y,e;w)). However, this solution is 
not incentive compatible, for (4.11) w~uld fail to hold. Thus, the optimal policy will 
entail allocating as much of R as possible to w until the incentive constraint (4.11) 
just binds. The optimal values of ~ and e are ~~ and ~~, respectively. The associated 
values of'!J.. and y are ;~ and ~~. At these levels, v('!J..'~;w) = ~~ and v(y,e;w) = ~~. In 
particular, this solution does not afford the agents equal welfare. 
4.2.2. The example continued with taxation 
Next, I extend the example to include taxation. In this case, an outcome will include 
a specification of the tax each agent must pay. Thus, the associated direct mechanism 
will specify «Y,~,I), (Y,e,7)). Now, I denote by v(y,e,T;w) the utility of agent w in 
the event it ~re to receive (y, e) and pay T. Analogous to (4.6), the government's 
objective is to: 
lexi m~ __ min{v(Y,~,I;w),v(y,e,T;w)} 
((1!&,D,(y,e,T» -
(4.12) 
subject to the incentive and fiscal constraints. However, now the latter take the form 
~ + e :::; I + 7, I :::; y, and T :::; y. 
As before, for ally values of ~, e, I, and T, (4.12) requires that y and y be chosen 
so as to maximize v(Y,~,1:; w) and v(y, e, 7; w), respectively. This again entails setting 
'!J.. = 4>2(W,~) and y - 4>2(W, e). Substituting into (4.12), the problem becomes 
or 
lexi max mini ~(1 +~) - I, ~(1 + e) -7} ((~,.!:),(e,T» 8 2 (4.13) 
subject to the constraints. 
Next, the incentive constraint for agent w will preclude V(Y,~,I;W) > v(y,e,7;w) 
at the solution to (4.13). Specifically, the constraint requi~es that v(y,e,7;w) > 
v('!J..,~,I; w), or substituting for '!J.., y, and w, 
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1 7 
-(1 + e) - T > -(1 + e) - T. 2 - 32 - - (4.14) 
In the absence of such rank reversals, the optimal policy will never entail taxing 
w for the purpose of providing educational resources either for itself or for w. Thus, 
T.. = O. Nor will such a policy entail taxing w for e. Thus, the sole remaining issue 
concerns the optimal level of T to provide ~. 
Substituting T.. = e = 0 and T =~, (4.13) reduces to 
lexi m;x min{~(l + ~), ~ - d (4.15) 
subject to the constraint ~ - ~ ;::: ~ (1 + ~). Clearly, the unconstrained solution to 
(4.15) would entail setting t(1 +~) = ~ -~, or ~ = i. However, this would violate 
(4.14). Instead, the constrained solution is ~ = 33' at which ~ - ~ = 3~(1 + ~). 
Thus, at the solution to (4.12), ~ and e are 1\ and 0, respectively. The associated 
values of 7!.. and y are 1~ and 1. And at these levels, v(7!..'~' T..; w) = 123 and v(y, e, 7; w) = 
;6. Here, too, the solution does not afford the agents equal welfare. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have shown that in the benchmark case involving complete informa-
tion, public education can be an effective means to equalize opportunities. Specifically, 
in this case, the necessary and sufficient condition that utility be separable in the pref-
erence parameter a: follows quite naturally. However, when abilities are unobservable, 
the power of the government to effect equitable opportunties via public education is 
restricted, even if utility is separable. While this limits the attractiveness of the ax-
iomatic approach, the social welfare function approach, by incorporating second-best 
considerations, affords an attractive alternative. 
6. Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. The proof proceeds as in Berliant and Gouveia [3], Propo-
sition 1, appropriately modified for the case in which the government wishes to im-
plement an education policy rather than individual revenue requirements, that is, in 
which the policy is to affect productivity rather than to collect agent-specific revenue. 
First, let e(·) be given. The (first-best) optimal income for an agent with innate 
ability w who receives educational resources e( w) is defined implicitly by the first order 
condition27 
(6.1) 
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'IjJ(.) is well-defined under the assumptions on U and ifJ. Moreover, 'IjJ(w) > 0 for all 
w > O. Let I(w) = (O,'IjJ(w)). Then I(w) is nonempty for all w. 
Define 
and 
Next, in the direct mechanism described previously, when facing the policy (y, e), 
agent i would solve the maximization problem 
_ y(w) m~u(y(w), ifJ(wi,e(w))). (6.2) 
The first order condition for (6.2) is 
( ( _) y( w) ) '( _) Ul y w , ifJ(wi, e(w)) . y w + 
(( _) y(w) ).(Y'(W).ifJ(wi,e(W))-ifJx(wi,e(w)).e'(W).Y(W)) U2 Y w 'ifJ(wi,e(w)) ifJ(wi ,e(w))2 
- o. (6.3) 
Truthful revelation requires that (6.3) hold at W = wi and, moreover, that it hold 
for all i. Thus, treating (6.3) as an identity yields 
Solving (6.4) for y', 
( ( i) y(wi») (i (i) '( i) y(Wi )2 
'(wi ) = U2 Y w '~(w.) .• ifJx w ,e w ). e.w . ~(wi) (6.5) 
Y Ul(Y(Wi), :~::~) + U2(Y(Wi ) , :~::~) • ~(~i) 
Under assumptions A.u and A.ifJ, there is a unique solution to (6.5) through each 
point (w, c) E 'IjJ+ and, moreover, the solution is continuous.28 In particular, choose 
28See Brock and Malliaris [7], Chapter 1, Theorem 5.1, p.14. 
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y(wm ) E I(wm ) (recall I(w) i- 0 for all w > 0), and let y(.) be the solution to (6.5) 
through (wm ,y(wm )).29 
Since the right-hand side (RHS) of (6.5) is Cl, y(.) is C2. 
Next, the second order condition for a solution to (6.2) is 
( ( _) y( iiJ) ) '( -)2 Un Y w , <p(wi , e(w)) . y w + 
( ( _) y(iiJ) ) (Y'(iiJ)' <p(wi, e(w)) - <Px(wi, e(iiJ)) . e'(w) . Y(iU)) '(_) 2U12 Y w , <p(wi, e(iU)) . <p(wi, e(w))2 . y w + 
( ( _) y(w) ) (Y'(iU). <p(wi, e(w)) - <Px(w
i
, e(iiJ)) . e'(iiJ) . Y(iiJ)) 2 
U22 Y w , <p(wi, e(iU)) . <p(wi, e(w))2 + 
( ( _) y( iiJ) ) "( _) Ul Y w , <p( wi , e( iiJ)) . Y w + 
( '( -) y( w) ) cPzz(wi ,e(w))·e'(w)·y(w)+cPz(wi ,e(w)).e"(w).y(w)+2cPz(wi ,e(w)).e'(w).y'(w) U2 Y w , <p(wi , e(w)) . cP(wi,e(';;;»2 
< o. 
At iiJ = wi, (6.6) can be written 
D2 -_ '2 2 (y' . cl> - <Px . e' . y) , Un . Y + U12' cl> 2 • Y + 
(
Y' . cl> - <Px . e' . y) 2 " 
U22 . cl> 2 + Ul . Y + 
(
y" <Pxx . e' . y + <Px . e" . y + 2<px . e' . y' 2<p~ . e'2 . y) 
U2' ¥ - cl> 2 + cl>3 
< 0, (6.7) 
where all functions are evaluated at w i . 
Next, differentiating the identity (6.4) and simplifying, 
,2 , (y" cl> - <Px . e' . y) Un . Y + 2U12 . Y . cl> 2 + 
(
Y' . cl> - <Px . e' . Y) 2 " U22 . cl>2 + Ul . Y + 
29Here y(w) is to be interpreted as the income of an agent with innate ability wafter receiving 
the educational resources e(w) and achieving the ex post ability q;(w). Thus, the labor expended in 
earning y( w) is g~::~. 
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(6.6) 
(
y" c/>xx . e' . y + C/>X • elf . y + 2c/>x . e' . y' 2c/>~ . e,2 . y) 
U2' ~ - <1>2 + <1>3 -
y . y' y (y, . <1> - C/>X . e' . y) 
U12 • """'i2 . C/>W - U22 • <1>2 • C/>W • <1>2 -
(
Y' . C/>W c/>xw . e' . y 2c/>w . C/>X • e' . y) 
U2 • <1>2 + <1>2 - <1>3 
_ O. (6.8) 
From (6.8), (6.7) can be rewritten as 
Y . Y Y y' - 'f/x . e . y I ( I <1> A. ' ) U12 . ~ • c/>w + U22 • <1>2 • c/>w . <1>2 + 
(y, . c/>w c/>ew . e' . Y 2c/>e . c/>w . e' . y) U2 • <1>2 + <1>2 - <1>3 < O. (6.9) 
I cb cb I I From (6.4), y. -r$2"'e .y = - U~~y • Substituting into (6.9) yields 
, 'A. , Y . Y Ul y. Y 'f/xw . e . y 
U12 • """'i2 . c/>w - U22 . U2 • """'i2 . c/>w + U2 • <1>2 
y' . c/>w c/>w . c/>x . e' . y 
-Ul' - U2' <1> <1>3 
< O. (6.10) 
Simplifying this expression, the appropriate second order condition when agents 
truthfully report their types is 
y . y' . . (U12 • U2 - U22 • Ul) _ • (Ul • y' . <1>2 + U2 • C/>X • e' . y) . c/>xw . e' . y 
<1>2 c/>w U2· c/>w <1>3 +U2 <1>2 < 0, 
or 
Providing y > 0 and y' > 0, the LHS of (6.11) is negative. Also, since e' < 0, it 
is sufficient that y > 0, y' > 0 and ~ ~ c/>xw to ensure that the RHS is positive. 
The latter follows immediately from Ac/>.4. I conclude by establishing y( w) > 0 and 
o 
y'(w) > 0 for all wEn. 
Returning to (6.5), since e' < 0, it is sufficient to show that y(w) > 0 and 
(6.12) 
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for all w En= (wm' wm]. However, (6.12) is equivalent to (w, y(w)) E 'I/J+. 
° Thus, it is sufficient to show that 'I/J( w) > y( w) > 0 for all wEn. 
° Clearly, 'I/J(wm) > y(wm) > 0 given the selection of y. To establish that 1jJ(w) > 
y{ w) for all w En, first, suppose to the contrary that there exists w En such that 
° ° y(w) ;::: 1jJ(w). Then since both 'I/J and y are continuous, there is a largest w' for which 
y(w') ;::: 1jJ(w')j indeed, it must be the case that y(w') = 'I/J(w'). Since n is bounded 
° 
above, consider a sequence {wn}:'=l such that Wn - w' from above. By (6.1) and 
(6.5), limn -+oo y'(wn ) = 00. 
Next, from (6.1), 
Differentiating, 
'I/J' = (U12 • 1jJ + U22 . * + U2) . <P' . 
Un • <p2 + 2U12 • <p + U22 (6.13) 
From Au.3, Un . u~ - 2U12 • Ul • U2 + U22 . u~ < O. Dividing by u~ and substituting 
<I> = _!!2 from (6.1) yields Un . <p2 + 2U12 • <p + U22 < o. Hence, the denominator of 
Ul 
(6.13) is negative. Also, by Au.3 and AuA, !£l. < !!U. Again substituting <p = _!!2 U2 U22 Ul 
yields -i < ~, or U12+ U22· i < O. Since 1jJ(w) > 0 for all wEn, U12 ·1jJ+U22· * < o. 
Also U2 < 0 by Au.3 and <I>' > 0 by A4>.2. Hence, the numerator of (6.13) is negative 
as well. Therefore, 1jJ' > 0 and finite, in particular at w'. Consequently, there exists 
w > w' for which y(w) > 1jJ(w), which contradicts the definition of w'. Hence, 1jJ(w) > 
y(w) for all wEn. 
° Clearly under Au.2 and Au.5, y(w) ;::: 0 for all w En. Suppose, however, that 
° for some WO En, y(WO) = 0 . Then by (6.5), y(w) = 0 for all w E (wm' WO]. Since 
° y(wm) > 0, consider an alternative solution to (6.5), say fj(.), such that at wm, 0 < 
fj(wm) < y{wm). Since fj and y are distinct and each is continuous, and since there 
is a unique solution to (6.5) through each point (w,c) E 1jJ+, it must be the case that 
y(w) > y(w) ;::: 0 for all w En. But since y(w) = 0 for all w E (wm,w°], this is a 
° contradiction .• 
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